October 2024 | Expert background: Prof. ZHA Daojiong – expert on China’s foreign relations
Zha Daojiong is Professor of International Political Economy in the School of International Studies and the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development, Peking University. His areas of expertise include non-traditional security studies and contemporary China’s international economic relations. His academic publications cover such topics as energy security, Chinese economic diplomacy, international development cooperation and the politics of international public health cooperation.
Dr. Zha is a regular participant in Track II dialogues between China and the United States on issues ranging from trade and investment to public health. He also contributes opinion pieces in newspapers including the South China Morning Post. He held visiting research fellowships those with the Nanyang University of Technology, Singapore (2009 and 2011), the Asia Society in New York (2016), the Isak Yusof Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (2018), and the Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School (2023).
Dr. Zha studied at the University of Hawaii and the East West Center, where he earned a Doctorate in Political Science. Before joining the faculty of Peking University in August 2007, he taught in the University of Macau, International University of Japan, Miyazaki International College, and Renmin University of China.
CMG: Prof. ZHA, on November 5th, the United States are going to elect a new President. Who does Beijing prefer – former President Donald Trump or the new Republican contender Kamala Harris?
I think Beijing does not have a preference, at least not one based on the record of past engagement with Washington.
The Harris campaign has been short on policy details for both domestic and international issues, in part as it did not have sufficient time to come up with a package of its own. The Trump campaign, meanwhile, is in a competitive mode to outperform the Biden-Harris administration on China. But in any case, the China policy of the Biden administration has been a continuation, expansion and escalation of the policies introduced under President Trump. Now, as candidates are both from the political establishment, neither Harris nor Trump can really afford a 'climb down' on China.
What does this mean in practice? In terms of engagement, since 2017, interactions between the American and the Chinese government agencies have been limited and highly scripted. So, in the early phase of this upcoming new US administration, China will have to first figure out how to relate to the White House after January 2025 and after understanding what of the campaign rhetoric is being turned into policy. Congress, however, is going to continue in the same manner as it has for the past several years when it comes to China.
How do you expect this election to shape US-China relations in the months and years ahead, and along which key topics?
From now until the elections, bilateral relations can be expected to be relatively non-eventful. Principally, in terms of competition – which is subject to a changing operational definition by the day – there are few areas left untouched. Each side is sufficiently familiar with the other side's position and routine.
In the years ahead, if – and this is a big 'if' – a new mode of interaction can be established, it will be interesting to see if the topics for engagement at the governmental level can extend beyond climate change, AI governance and world financial stability – including for instance issues like debt distress that some low-income countries face.
Security issues in the Taiwan Strait and the maritime space in the East and South China Seas, meanwhile, will likely be a repetition of the recent past. They will continue to dominate news headlines. This is because third parties, like the political capitals in Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei or Manila, have their respective independent agency and power. This also places limits on impulses from either Washington DC or Beijing to get them 'in line'.
What could this mean for China’s domestic policy priorities and the country’s relations with Europe?
China’s domestic policy priority will continue to be on managing the transition from a growth model focusing on infrastructure build-up and property development to one driven by technological progress and managerial innovation. This is a long-term process, and trade with the rest of the world will have to continue to be a key pillar in this model.
Trade and investment will therefore continue to be a priority for China's engagement with Europe. That engagement will be more project-oriented, but there is greater interest in dispute handling with Europe through the WTO than with the US, so long as Europe continues to utilize the WTO as an instrument as well.
To what extent do you think a transatlantic united front can be formed between the U.S. and Europe in their common economic approach toward China in the years to come? Like more punitive tariffs and export controls.
Prospects for a transatlantic united front on China hinge on a host of factors. The resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is one of them – at least in terms of public rhetoric from European foreign policy elites.
But there is a risk for the trend of Brussels increasingly moving in lock step with Washington DC on tech and trade to become a pattern. There are at least two contributing factors. One is that the resilience and derisking push led by Brussels yields significant results for Europe. The other is that Beijing fails to generate a coherent rationale for Europe to act differently from the rest of 'the West' – i.e. Europe and North America.
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