Xi Jinping’s 2026 State Visit to Washington
Updated: Sep 29
September 2026 | The September 2026 Xi-Trump meeting in Washington DC continued the trend that started in October 2025 when the two leaders met in Busan, South Korea.
Since then, the US and China have succeeded keeping their relationship relatively stable by maintaining a truce in their trade war and not taking actions that the other side would regard as highly provocative, thereby deviating from a phase of escalating tensions in this bilateral relationship lasting from 2009 (beginning of Barack Obama’s first term as US president initiating the foreign policy shift later coined “Pivot to Asia”) until last year.
China and the US first tested maintaining a state of “strategic stability” among these two great powers in the final year of the Biden administration, but the current approach has a firmer basis. In 2024, Biden’s attempt to get re-elected was the main motive for the US to refrain from escalatory actions, but this had no significance after he lost the election.
China’s deployment in 2025 of counter tariffs and restrictions of rare earth exports made it clear that, at least for now, the US has no means to significantly harm the Chinese economy without China doing the same to the US.
While it is unclear how long the post-Busan state of “strategic stability” will last, it is an indication that China as a great power has developed to a level where it can at least temporarily resist economic coercion from the US. This suggests an ongoing process of multipolarization of the international order.
Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington is a follow-up to the Busan meeting and Trump’s visit to Beijing in May of 2026. This succession of bilateral meetings constitutes the main organizational underpinning of US-China efforts to stabilize their relationship and is scheduled to be continued in November in Shenzhen (during APEC) and in December in Miami (during the G20 summit).
From the two sides’ read-outs at the end of Xi’s three-day visit to Washington, it becomes clear that China is more reserved about the achieved consensus. Different from what the US billed as a historic state visit, China merely defined it as a state visit, downplaying its importance in dictating the terms of Sino-US future engagement and competition and reflecting Beijing’s more cool-headed approach toward the Sino-US relations.
The visit was rather rich in optics but light in substance. Both sides agreed to extend the shaky trade truce by another two months to January 10, 2027, avoiding a spike in already high cost-of-living crisis for US consumers right before the midterm election. Whereas China demanded a truce for the rest of the Trump administration, the two-month extension provides Washington with leverage to ensure appropriate shipment levels of rare earths and other critical minerals from China.
Compared to Washington’s emphasis on the achievements of bilateral anti-narcotics cooperation at the beginning of its read-out, Beijing instead placed a premium on its recognized equal status with the US by listing “the two countries agreed to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity” as the first item in the China’s official read-out.
Indeed, it is a reaffirmation of what has been touted as the biggest victory in Beijing in the wake of President Trump’s state visit to Beijing in May, during which the US for the first time views China as an equal player in world affairs, a position the US had refused to accept, worrying that placing the US and China on an equal footing would grant China greater influence in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
However, China falls short of achieving its goals in two critical geopolitical hotspots, Japan and Taiwan. According to the read-outs, the two leaders recalled that United States and China were allies in World War II (WWII) and fought side by side to win the war. The expression is shy of China’s preferred language that also emphasized safeguarding the legacy of WWII victory, which had been appearing in its declarations or communiques with friendlier countries and implying Japan’s wartime history as an enemy state that cannot be trusted on the global stage.
The intentional absence from the final wording reflected US insistence that the US does not see its most important ally in this region as challenging the post-WWII international order.
It is notable that there was no mention of the “Taiwan issue” in both read-outs. This indicates that China failed to shift the US tone from not supporting outright Taiwan independence to flatly opposing independence, a shift that would open the door to placing the blame for cross-strait tensions on Taiwan’s policies.
Along with the Trump administration’s aim of re-establishing the US as the unrivalled hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, the US government maintains its long-standing strategy of preventing the establishment of hegemonic actors in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. There is no indication that the current administration contemplates ceding regional leadership in Asia to China. Preventing the People’s Republic of China from incorporating Taiwan remains a key component in the US strategy to counterbalance China’s strong influence in East and Southeast Asia.
Beijing, at the same time, does not give any material support to the US war in Iran by promising to reduce its oil imports from Iran or other financial and tech support, reflecting the common perception that the Iran war should not be tied to the “Taiwan issue”.
Finally, a rather vague outcome of the visit is the agreement to establish the U.S.-China Super Intelligence (SI) Dialogue to exchange views on risks and benefits related to SI. Unlike the US summary, the Chinese readout uses the term AI (人工智能) rather than SI (超级智能) to describe the applicable emerging technologies.
Given the wide differences in terms of their understanding of the AI technologies, it is hard to imagine any material progress in terms of the AI governance. China’s Ministry of State Security has recently warned that AI could threaten political and social security—an implicit reference to US technological dominance. In other words, the AI arms races won’t see a pause until China is confident of its technological progress on parity with the US.
CMG supports international business and investors in understanding the changed geopolitical context, identifying relevant short-term and long-term risks and opportunities, as well as how to think structurally for engagement in the Chinese market and making better strategic decisions.
Appendix: Chinese official summary of the outcome of the Trump-Xi talks in Washington and corresponding text from the US summary
1. 双方同意构建“基于尊重、公平、对等的中美建设性战略稳定关系”
President Trump and President Xi discussed fostering peace and prosperity to enhance confidence for businesses and consumers around the world. The two countries agreed to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity.
2. 双方同意相互支持对方办好亚太经合组织（APEC）领导人非正式会议和二十国集团（G20）领导人峰会。两国元首有意出席对方主办的会议。
The two countries will support each other as respective hosts of G20 and APEC, with both leaders intending to attend each other’s Summit.
3. 两国元首同意伊朗应履行不发展核武器的承诺，任何国家或机构都不得对国际水道征收通行费
The two leaders discussed on-going global concerns, including Russia, North Korea, and Iran. They agreed that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon and that no country or institution can be allowed to impose tolls on international waterways.
4. 两国元首忆及中国和美国是二战盟友，并肩作战赢得战争胜利
The two leaders recalled that United States and China were allies in World War II and fought side by side to win the war.
5. 两国元首认可中美经贸磋商机制积极作用和双方经贸团队磋商成果，包括建立并推进贸易理事会等机制，达成“300亿美元”对等降税安排，延期吉隆坡经贸磋商成果等，并指示予以落实。
Under the Board of Trade, the two countries reached consensus on recommendations for more favorable tariff treatment for $30 billion of non-sensitive goods in each direction. The Board of Trade also launched a working group focused on addressing market access barriers in the agricultural sector.
6. 中美禁毒执法部门合作取得可视化成果。近期，双方密切合作，联合破获多起涉新精神活性物质及前体化学品案件，在两国抓获数十名相关犯罪嫌疑人。
The United States welcomed China’s scheduling of orphines, a class of deadly drugs. The United States also noted China’s new export controls on two fentanyl precursor chemicals, while strongly encouraging the permanent scheduling of these and other substances and chemicals to help stem the flow of illicit precursors to dangerous narcoterrorists in North America.
In August 2026, acting on information from U.S. law enforcement, China arrested 21 Chinese citizens for the manufacture and distribution of precursor chemicals to illicit drug producers in North America. The United States strongly encouraged maximum sentences, including the death penalty where applicable.
7. 双方同意建立中美人工智能对话，交流人工智能相关风险和惠益。下次对话将于今年11月举行。双方同意建立人工智能事件的沟通渠道。
The two leaders agreed to use the term “super intelligence” rather than “artificial intelligence” to describe the applicable emerging technologies.
The two countries established the U.S.-China Super Intelligence (SI) Dialogue to exchange views on risks and benefits related to SI. The next exchange will occur by November 2026. The United States and China also agreed to establish a bilateral communication channel for SI incidents.
8. 美方欢迎中方租借给美国亚特兰大动物园的一对大熊猫抵美。
The United States welcomes the arrival of two giant pandas, leased by China to the Atlanta Zoo.
此外，中美两军还同意尽快签署加强危机沟通与预防的谅解备忘录，继续合作搜寻在华美军失踪人员遗骸。
In addition, the Chinese and U.S. militaries agree to conclude a memorandum of understanding on crisis communication and prevention as soon as possible, and continue their cooperation to search for the remains of missing U.S. servicemembers in China.